China’s outreach to Syria signals its growing sway in Middle East as counterweight to West

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s visit to Hangzhou underscores Beijing’s aim to broaden its regional influence beyond trade
But China’s aim to play a bigger role in the Middle East is being constrained by its own economic slowdown

Alessandro Arduino

Published: 10:30am, 27 Sep, 2023

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As the 19th Asian Games got under way in Hangzhou, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad arrived in the Chinese city for a significant bilateral summit with President Xi Jinping. The visit, amid a 12-year-long civil war that has shackled Assad’s international movements due to punishing sanctions and widespread ostracism, marked a significant turning point in China- Syria ties.

While the Western world continues to give the cold shoulder to Assad, regional powers in the Middle East have extended to him a cautious hand of welcome, with high-level meetings in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. His attendance at the Arab League summit in May was evidence of this gradual rehabilitation.

From an international standpoint, his meeting with President Xi not only signifies a broader base of support for Assad but also holds the potential to consolidate his position on the domestic front, backed by a promising commitment from China for substantial investments in the country’s reconstruction.

President Xi’s stance on Syria can be succinctly summarised in his assertion that “China supports Syria in conducting reconstruction, enhancing counterterrorism capacity building, and promoting a political settlement of the Syrian issue following the ‘Syrian-led, Syrian-owned’ principle”.

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Beijing has been steadfast in its commitment to promoting a Syrian-led political resolution since the outset of the civil war. Syria was among the first Arab nations to recognise the People’s Republic of China, but another catalyst for Beijing’s support has been its concerns that the Arab spring would spread across the region.

China’s alignment with Russia against a UN Security Council resolution on international aid to Syria in 2019 exemplifies this commitment. Also, Xi’s emphasis on bolstering counterterrorism efforts is rooted in China’s apprehension, dating back to 2017, that Uygur extremists might join jihadist organisations in Syria.

In this respect, the enactment of China’s counterterrorism law in 2015 enabled the People’s Liberation Army to potentially dispatch counterterrorism units to foreign nations upon invitation, and Syria has remained on Beijing’s shortlist.

Regarding reconstruction, Damascus’ hopes have soared since the 2018 Reconstruction and Trade Summits, during which numerous Chinese state-owned enterprises pledged US$2 billion in investments. In 2019, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade reached US$1.3 billion. Yet despite China’s provision of medical equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic, its economic and financial engagement with Syria has been ebbing.

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in Beijing on April 6. Photo: Xinhua

Given the current gloomy economic outlook for China, there is uncertainty about whether substantial investments will flow into Syria in the near future. This contrasts with the largesse of aid and financing for macro projects extended under the Belt and Road Initiative when President Xi launched his flagship foreign policy initiative a decade ago. A similar parallel can be drawn with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, where initial expectations of Chinese investment have not been met.

The true allure of reconstruction projects in Syria lies not so much in energy and natural resources – as it has less to offer compared to its oil-rich Middle Eastern neighbours – but in the geopolitical significance of its two ports, Tartus and Latakia, in the Levant. The ports are strategically located near other container terminals that are part of China’s belt and road plans, such as Piraeus in Greece, Haifa in Israel, and Tripoli in Lebanon.

China, however, is not the sole contender eyeing a role in Syria’s reconstruction. Tehran and Moscow are also seeking to translate their military support for Assad into economic and geopolitical gains. Russia has openly expressed interest in Tartus and Iran aspires to be involved in the Syrian automotive and telecommunication sectors.

China’s diplomatic overtures to Assad are part of a larger mosaic that Beijing is crafting in the Middle East. Its long-standing principle of non-interference is gradually evolving into a more proactive stance, with the Middle East witnessing a rise in Beijing’s dynamic diplomacy – starting with its involvement in the unprecedented rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

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Therefore, the recent Chinese-Syrian summit serves to underscore how China is broadening its traditional focus and moving beyond mere trade partnerships in the region, while treading cautiously when it comes to political matters.

Simultaneously, Beijing is racing to promote a multipolar order, one that is no longer dominated by the presence of the United States. This endeavour encompasses greater involvement from the Middle East in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with Iran recently joining as a member, and the Brics+ initiative, which has extended an open invitation to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Beijing’s diplomacy, from brokering a detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran to engaging in reconstruction efforts in Syria, underscores the idea that economic development and security stabilisation are interlinked – promoting, at the same time, China as an alternative player to Western countries in the Global South.

While the meeting with the Syrian president bestows upon China another diplomatic arrow in its quiver to position itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East, the true test will lie in how Beijing can effectively provide reconstruction help to a war-ravaged nation amid mounting economic constraints at home.

Alessandro Arduino is an affiliate lecturer at the Lau China Institute and King’s College London. He is the author of Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War.